How To Break Anything

Thoughts and insights on culture and human behavior, living blissfully at the intersection of rationality and irrationality (but mostly irrationality) 
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Comparing two methods of assigning value to actions - direct causality vs "irreplaceable" causality

The following describes part of a challenge of spending time efficiently, as posed in an essay titled "The Hidden Costs (in Time) of Spending Time":

Any given goal that I have tends to require an enormous amount of "administrative support" in the form of homeostasis, chores, transportation, and relationship maintenance. I estimate that the ratio may be as high as 7:1 in favor of what my conscious mind experiences as administrative bullshit, even for relatively simple tasks.

For example, suppose I want to go kayaking with friends. My desire to go kayaking is not strong enough to override my desire for food, water, or comfortable clothing, so I will usually make sure to acquire and pack enough of these things to keep me in good supply while I'm out and about. I might be out of snack bars, so I bike to the store to get more. Some of the clothing I want is probably dirty, so I have to clean it. I have to drive to the nearest river; this means I have to book a Zipcar and walk to the Zipcar first. If I didn't rent, I'd have to spend some time on car maintenance. When I get to the river, I have to rent a kayak; again, if I didn't rent, I'd have to spend some time loading and unloading and cleaning the kayak. After I wait in line and rent the kayak, I have to ride upstream in a bus to get to the drop-off point.

Of course, I don't want to go alone; I want to go with friends. So I have to call or e-mail people till I find someone who likes kayaking and has some free time that matches up with mine and isn't on crutches or sick at the moment. Knowing who likes kayaking and who has free time when -- or at least knowing it well enough to do an intelligent search that doesn't take all day -- requires checking in with lots of acquaintances on a regular basis to see how they're doing.

There are certainly moments of pleasure involved in all of these tasks; clean water tastes good; it feels nice to check in on a friend's health; there might be a pretty view from the bumpy bus ride upstream. But what I wanted to do, mostly, was go kayaking with friends. It might take me 4-7 hours to get ready to kayak for 1-2 hours.

My take on the challenge here is that the above advocates a method of assigning value to actions based on the causal relationship between performing it and the direct impact of that action on the desired goal. To simplify, I'll reference the above elements as processes of 1) assigning value to individual actions based on causal relationships, and 2) determining a causal relationship between performing an action and its direct impact on the world.

In the above model, an efficient action is one where we can clearly determine that its rationally causal relationship with impact on the world contributes to our desired goal. More importantly, in this model it is critical that the action contributes to our desired goal directly.

Consider an action that is homeostatic in nature - buying food. Spending time buying food does not directly contribute to our desired goal of "engaging in the act of kayaking"; as such, it isn't valued as efficient in the above model.

We do recognize however, that buying food is an irreplaceable step in the system of actions required to "engage in the act of kayaking." To the extent that an individual action is irreplaceable in a system of actions required to accomplish a goal, that action is important and valuable [this is a premise I'll call the irreplaceability premise]. With this premise in mind, it is easier to see that the act of buying food has an impact on "engaging in the act of kayaking" that is just as important as the act of pushing the kayak into the water - both are equally irreplaceable. 

Using the directness model, we consider buying food as less valuable because it is less directly related to the happiness we experience from kayaking. If the irreplaceability premise is well-founded, then the directness model is a weak method of assigning value to actions - and thinking about irreplaceability may help resolve some of the concerns that arise with how to most optimally spend one's time, as described below.

[It's important to note as an aside that this particular application of the irreplaceability premise is founded on the notion that if the act of eating is removed, the act of pushing the kayak into the water will never take place. We can easily imagine an alternative scenario - you push the kayak into the water while hungry - so I'm supporting this irreplaceability with the sentiment contained within the statement "my desire to go kayaking is not strong enough to override my desire for food." It is in fact worth considering the function of time and our ability to delay homeostatic actions in this notion of "irreplaceability," but as an absolute definition, homeostatic actions will always be necessary and ultimately irreplaceable - it is equally easy to imagine an alternative, lengthier goal where delaying homeostatic behaviors ultimately do not reduce their necessity.]

To help make the irreplaceability premise more clear, consider also actions that are not homeostatic. As an undergraduate, I would often be conflicted about the directness of my actions and how to assess their value - most notably when the desired goal was something like "delivering a presentation for a class final." At some point it occurs to you that you're spending hours or even days preparing for a goal defined as a 20 minute task, and this seems like the same kind of waste mentioned above in the expression "it might take me 4-7 hours to get ready to kayak for 1-2 hours." But it is relatively easy for one to intuitively see a causal relationship between preparing slides and organizing sources as important to the end goal, so operating under the directness model our worries of wasted time are at least somewhat assuaged.

The problem is that the directness model again breaks down over lengths of time, where irreplaceable actions are not intuitively direct actors in the causal relationship between action and goal. 30 seconds of the presentation may come from ideas fostered over hours and hours of time going to class - and worse yet for directness, they may reflect the synthesis of disparate ideas captured across various chunks of time spent in lecture.

I'm not necessarily sure that the irreplaceability model is any better a tool for assigning value in our attempts to calculate efficiency (in a complex enough system it quickly becomes easy to identify every action as irreplaceable), but the above examples help illustrate the challenges of assigning value based on direct causality.

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Filed under  //   causality   irrationality   optimization   perspective   time   value  

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From: Brooklyn Brainery!: Irrational Decisions wrapup

Kyle's How To Make Irrational Decisions wrapped up on Monday. I took plenty of notes, so let's go through the things that complicate the choices we make, then look at what we can do to make our decisions easier!

Why Making Decisions Is So Hard

Every time we make a decision, we're looking at two different parts of the result, what we get and when we get it. Sometimes deciding between the two is easy. Do I want $50 or $80? I'll take $80, thanks! Do I want it now or a month from now? Now, obviously!

Life isn't like that, though - the whats and the whens get all mixed up, and the decisions get harder. $50 now or $80 a month from now? Sure, having $50 in your hand right now feels a lot better, but an extra $30 sure makes waiting attractive. Let's illustrate this with adorable children waiting for marshmallows:

There are three different ways to focus your energy - the past, the present, and the future. Would you just eat the first marshmallow? You're present-oriented. Would you wait for the second? Future-oriented. Things like studying hard in school or saving for retirement are good examples of being future-oriented out in the non-marshmallow-related world.

But oh, oh, oh, it gets harder, even! Once uncertainty comes into the picture, everything gets much worse. Do you want $50, or a 50% chance at winning $100, but if you lose you get nothing? Math gives us a way of comparing the two - multiplying the probability by the payout gives the "expected payoff". $100 times 50% is $50, and $50 times 100% is also $50 - math is telling us the two are the same, but our brains sure don't think that way. (Confused? Check this out, or just trust me!)

Once outcomes are uncertain everything becomes a lot more personal. Do you just need $50 to buy a pair of new shoes, or do you really need that $100 to make rent? Are you a risk taker? This is all under the umbrella of risk aversion, which gets a lot more complicated if you head over to Wikipedia.

Now, once we start thinking about how "personal" a decision is we need to start thinking about what that really means. We have an idea that we operate in our own little sphere and are in complete control of all of our ideas and actions, when that's really not true at all.

If you ask someone to write down the word "see" half of people will write 'see' and the other half will write 'sea.' If you make a waving motion with your hand, though, suddenly everyone's writing 'sea.' Right, waves! Every decision you make is influenced by things you've experienced recently, and this is called priming (Wikipedia). Holding a cold drink will make you think more negatively than a hot one. If you just watched a romantic comedy, it might be harder to break up with your boyfriend. You don't make decisions in a vacuum.

Priming doesn't necessarily make decisions easier or harder, it's just something that complicates the idea of making a "best" or "rational" decision - what you think is a perfectly thought-out decision right now might not be the same an hour later after you've had to sit on the subway for a while, or look at an ad, or aren't nearly so hungry. Realizing that in every moment your choices are going to look a little different can go a long way in relaxing about decision-making.

While talking about the "best" decision, regret is an important aspect. Once you've made a decision, you're locking out all the choices you didn't make. You might have a tendency to fixate on everything you've lost out on when you make a decision - this is called the opportunity cost. If you buy this shirt you can't buy those shoes, or how taking one job prevents you from taking another.

Another big thing is sunk costs, which is anything you've spent on something that you can't get back. These costs usually make you want to go further with something, even if you don't like it: spending years in a relationship is a deterrent to leaving it, spending thousands on grad school makes you determined to work in a specific field. I think these are big big big factors when dealing with long-term, important decisions.

Okay, enough depressing stuff, let's talk about how we can make some better decisions!

How to Make Better Decisions

The most important thing about making better decisions is acknowledging that there are a lot of factors at play, and nothing you do is the One True Best Awesome Decision.

The past, the present, the future - all of these are different times to revel in, and one isn't necessarily better than the other. Saving for retirement is a good example: partying down now might seem wasteful to some people, but you don't know if you'll even be alive in 50 years to enjoy the money that you've saved. Maybe spending that money on seeing a band is going to mean more to you than an extra night on a Seniors Cruise down the line. On the other hand, giving up that extra drink might be worth not living in a cardboard box later down the road. Chances are you're looking for balance.

Uncertainty isn't always a bad thing. Understand that there are always unknowns. While we used the $50 or 50% chance at $100 example before, nothing in life is ever that clean-cut. Uncertainty exists along the way, just not in the results. When you go to grad school, you aren't just taking a gamble that you'll get a fancy job when you get out of school - you're also meeting new people and experiencing things you wouldn't have if you were just out in the working world. In the same way, if you get a job instead of going to school you're amassing experiences and business contacts, and each of those interactions changes where your decision is taking you.

Kyle brought up chaos theory as a way of thinking about this - life isn't just X causes Y, it's X sends you towards Y, A interrupts, steers you towards B, but then C edges you back in the direction of W, and etc etc etc forever and ever. No matter how well-informed you are, you never have perfect information about what a decision is going to do and what it is going to mean in the future.

An important take-away from the class for me was that when you are making a decision, you aren't determining the result. When you pick someone to date, that's all you're picking - you haven't secured them in eternal marriage, you don't know if you'll hate how they fold laundry in six years, you don't know if you'll fall for an especially charming gas station attendant. All decisions can do is guide you in a direction, not guarantee an outcome, so you definitely have room to relax.

We talked about priming before, the idea that everything around you is affecting your decision-making. I think the best way to deal with this is to just acknowledge that it exists and move on. Understand that even though you might love to be 100% in control and perfectly rational all of the time, it just can't happen. You can try to look around and see what recent experiences are influencing your decisions, but don't stress out about it too much. Experiences are what make us who we are, and a decision influenced by them is no more or less natural than something perfectly "rational."

The most important thing to remember about sunk costs is that sunk costs are sunk. You are not getting them back, no matter what, so just ignore them! You buy tickets to a baseball game, but it's raining. Don't go. You're miserable in your relationship, but you've been there for 5 years, and you feel like you owe it to all of that effort to keep on going. You don't. You aren't getting your time or money back, so go ahead and make the decision that will make you happiest in the future. Realizing that sunk costs are so much of the reason you want to go to the game or stay in the relationship will help empower you to make the tough decision to ignore the costs and do what will make you happy.

A fun idea some people brought up was the mindset that "Every Decision I Make Is Right." Instead of worrying about your decisions, you just make them, and trust that you've done the right thing. Just like the fox and the grapes, sometimes the way you think about things is even more important than what actually happened.

The toughest part about making a decision is the period before you actually make it. You stress out, you overthink things, you take ages of pain to come to a conclusion. Just decide! There are enough unknowns out there that neither can really be the best, I promise. My rule of thumb is to take the path that seems to give you the most options down the road - even if you didn't make the "right" decision right now, one of those choices later on is sure to make up for it. So just embrace the fact that there's a lot more going on that you could ever account for, take a deep relaxing breath, and go on making those irrational decisions!

Jonathan Soma over at the Brooklyn Brainery posted this fantastic write up of the How To Make Irrational Decisions class. A nice blend of topics I introduced, and how those are interpreted by someone other than myself.

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Filed under  //   causality   context   decisionmaking   irrationality   want  

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One model for thinking about roles and relationships: Philosopher/Scientist/Entrepreneur/Artist

The above is something of an infographic that I threw together to start modelling a ton of complicated questions that have been going through my head, when thinking about the complex ways that value and meaning manifest themselves in the world. As I think more on these things the nature of the above will surely evolve but I figure it's a good place to start.

The questions in my head that have driven the above come from a lot of places and my thinking on them I'll explain more deeply in future posts; some basic thoughts on it for now:

  • It's not a perfect model for anything, but it has helped me frame things in a way that I've found useful. Certainly everyone fills these roles in different ways and incorporates combinations of characteristics into their own lives - it's not useful to think of anybody as falling into just one of the above, and its not useful to think that anyone falls into all four.
  • I started by primarily trying to express the nature of how each role informs the others. The basic question here is: who is more valuable to the world: the artist or the scientist? The basic answer is: neither.
  • Another basic question: how should we think about the different kind of value between things that are simple, widely-adopted and business-valuable as compared to things that are niche, difficult, and wisdom-valuable? @tylertravitz approaches the idea below:
    The thinking comes seeing a question many people have to ask themselves as they create things in the world: do I want things like more page hits (which genuinely leads to more influence) or do I want to express more insight at the risk of losing that level of influence? (On another level: is this a question of balance, or is this an arena where balance isn't the optimal strategy?)
  • I've also touched on rationality/irrationality, beginning from questions like: how has 'irrationality' become a pejorative, and how can we model it in balance with rationality?

Lots more thinking to follow on all the above; stay tuned. On some level I've questioned that these things even exist on linear scales, but for the time being it's been a useful place to start.

[imgs by Hans and Carolyn, densitydesign]

 

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Filed under  //   irrationality   paradox   rationality   value  

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Cognitive bias video/song, and some thoughts on optimization

 

Totally love the above video @fatgator passed along to me ha.
 
At some point in life one of the questions you have to answer for yourself is this:
 
To what degree is cognitive bias a fundamentally negative part of the human condition? 
 
For example, the charge behind lesswrong.org is that bias is fundamentally wrong in the purest sense of the word; one's goal should be to become less biased, thus optimizing one's life. 
 
There's another angle that wonders what it means for the universe to even have something like "wrong in the most pure sense of the word." This has to do with the question: what does it even mean to optimize one's life?
 
The quintessential example is the machine that knows so much about you that it can perfectly 'optimize' your life (and I mean optimize in the purest sense of the word - that is to say that it is unbiased, perfectly calculating, and error-free): when it tells you in a morning email exactly all the steps to follow in order to have an 'optimized' life, do you follow it to the letter? 
 
I've only been asking this question for a couple months but I have yet to run into someone who calls this 'optimal.' 
 
In other words, even optimization strategies have optimization strategies. 
 
Just a thought, but it's what I think about when I wonder about the idea of 'better living through less bias.'  

 

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Filed under  //   cognitive fallacies   irrationality   optimaization   philosophy   rationality  

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Why I believe in irrationality: cognitive and physical limitations, etc

[img via Benchilada]

You may or may not be aware that I'm scheduled to write for the 3six5 project in about a month. I had a pretty insightful thought this morning relevent to what I'll be writing about so I set up a google calendar alert to remind myself about it.

Those of you who know me know I'm of the "memory is nothing close to our typical conception of it" camp, so I do things like this all the time. I set alerts constantly, and I always have a pad of paper and pen on my person.

If I could say one thing about why I believe so strongly in irrationality, it would be because I'm so aware of our cognitive limitations. Of those limitations, memory seems to be a relatively benign and acceptable one to us (though entirely pervasive), but it's our other limitations that make irrationality a dirty word.

I could go on and on about these limitations (see this list of how you could be completely wrong about everything) but suffice to say that if you tell anyone they are fundamentally irrational and far less in control of their deceisions than they think, they're inclined to argue you down about it.

This is because we tend to think of "control" and volition in terms of the things that the prefrontal cortex consciously determines, which is absurd given the ridiculously small amount of influence the PFC actually has.


Here's what's strange to me: if I tell someone that I can influence their ability to grab a box just by placing it high on a shelf where they can't reach it, they seem to be fine with that.

But if I tell them I can influence their decision between healthy fruit salad and fattening chocolate cake just by giving them some numbers to memorize beforehand, they're not so comfortable. (After all, they are in control of that decision, certainly...)

Or if I tell them that I can make them answer the question "do you like this [random, unknown] person?" either 'yes' or 'no' simply by having them hold a cup of coffee as I'm asking? Even less comfortable. (in fact, the description of the Radiolab link I just provided there even begins with the description "It's scary to think that choice might just be an illusion.")


The point being that I find it a little silly/humorous that we completely accept our physical limitations, but adamantly deny that we have cognitive ones as well. 

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Filed under  //   cognitive fallacies   irrationality  

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Pulitzer Prize-winning jazz musician Wynton Marsalis on improvisation and imagination, related to choice/rational decisionmaking

"...where there might only be noise. Insisting on more when one already has enough is usually considered greed. In the case of choice, it is also a sign of the failure of the imagination."

[from The Art Of Choosing, Sheena Iyengar]

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Filed under  //   decisionmaking   irrationality  

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re: "How to learn from failure": time-orientation and judging events/outcomes

Learning from failure is not intuitively rational, but only because of the context we assign to the event of 'failing.' Like many problems of context and definition, it is one of time perspective.

This isn't too profound of a concept; essentially the reason time perspective applies is simply because if you're conceptually judging an decision as a 'failure' or 'success,' the only thing that matters is whether you're looking at the the immediate consequences of the decision or the distant consequences.

On a long enough timeline, every decision is a success, in the "you learn something from everything" sense. On a short enough timeline, every decision is a failure, in the "you haven't accomplished your goals yet" sense.

Obviously there's a balance to be struck here. The best part: where that balance is found is entirely within your perceptual control. (somewhat related: "If you have control over conditions, you have control over decisions)

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Filed under  //   irrationality   perspective   time-orientation  

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Decisions are about comparison. If you have control over conditions, you have control over decisions.

Decisions are fundamentally about context, in the sense that context refers to the conditions in which decisions are made. 

The easiest way to think about this is that making a decision is by definition the act of comparing conditions. 

Change the conditions, and you change the decision.

The classic example of this is the comparison one makes between three similar items of low, moderate, and high price. The smart menu planner adds an item of high price that no one will ever buy, simply so that the mid-level item can be priced higher and still seem like the best choice by comparison. This is one example, there are thousands of others. Dan Gilbert gives loads of them here in this video:

Change the conditions, and you change the decision.

If you have control over conditions, you have control over decisions.

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Filed under  //   decisionmaking   irrationality  

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"Choice," engineered and constructed like a well designed building

Behavioural economics is described (by Thaler himself) as ‘ libertarian paternalism’. This is the idea that while people should be able to live their lives as they want, “it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better”.

I find the counterintuitive reality of how we make decisions compellingly beautiful.

If you'd like, there's a rather wordy explanation of behavioral economics below:

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